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Last year Queensland Parliament introduced the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 
(Qld).  This legislation radically changed the assessment of damages for most personal 
injury claims commenced in Queensland on or after 18 June 2002. 
 
The Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) amends the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 
and imports into the law of Queensland provisions which alter common law principles 
concerning the determination of liability in civil actions commenced on or after 9 April 
2003.  In general, the amendments have the effect of making it more difficult for 
claimants to succeed in their actions. 
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 Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) 
 
Commencement 
 
The Civil Liability Act 2003 (“the Act”) was proclaimed to commence from 9 April 2003.  
The amendments are partially retrospective, in that they extend to civil liability arising on 
or after 2 December 2002.  Chapter 2, Part 2 of the Act, dealing with proportionate 
liability, will commence on a date to be proclaimed.  The principal provisions of the Act 
are discussed below. 
 
The law of civil liability (chapter 1, part 2) 
 
The Act operates as an amendment to the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002, 
although certain provisions of the Act relate to civil actions which do not involve claims 
for damages for personal injury, such as actions in negligence against professionals.  
The Act applies to any civil claim for damages for harm regardless of whether the claim 
is brought in tort, in contract, under statute or otherwise.  “Harm” is defined broadly to 
include personal injury, damage to property and economic loss.  The Act specifically 
binds the Crown. 
 
The Act does not apply to circumstances of civil liability for claims for which there are 
already in place statutory compensation regimes (this includes, workers’ compensation 
claims, dust diseases claims and claims arising from exposure to tobacco smoke.  
Unlike the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002, the Civil Liability Act 2003 will affect 
claims the subject of the compulsory third party legislation in Queensland. 
 
Section 7(1) of the Act provides that the Act does not purport to create or confer any 
cause of civil action for the recovery of damages.  Presumably, in the event of any 
discrepancy, a court will revert to the common law position concerning the operation of 
the law regarding breach of duty, as it existed pre the Civil Liability Act 2003. 
 
Importantly, section 7(3) of the Act notes that parties may contract out of the provisions 
of the Act.  Chapter 2 of the Act then sets out a number of general principles of the law 
of negligence and contains several provisions concerning the application of these 
principles in certain situations.  These are discussed separately. 
 
Breach of duty (part 1, division 1) 
 
The Act introduces an obligatory two-tier test for determining whether a person has 
breached a duty of care by failing to take precautions against a risk of harm (Section 9).  
Each limb of the test must be satisfied as a pre-requisite to the finding of a breach of 
duty.  The first tier recognises that only certain risks will give rise to a claim: 
 
1. The risk must be foreseeable (that is, a risk which a person knew or ought 
reasonably to have known); 
 
2. The risk must not be insignificant; 
 
3. In the circumstances, a reasonable person in that person’s position would have 
taken precautions against a risk of harm. 
Centre of Philanthropy and Nonprofit Studies 4 Working Paper No. CPNS18 
 In addition, a court is now bound to take into account the following factors when 
considering whether a person has failed to take reasonable steps to minimise or avoid 
the risk: 
 
1. The probability that the harm would occur if care were not taken; 
2. The likely seriousness of the harm; 
3. The burden of taking precautions to avoid the risk of harm; 
4. The social utility of the activity that creates the risk of harm. 
 
Section 9 largely involves a re-statement of the common law position.  Further, given 
that the test in section 9 is a test as to whether a person has not breached a duty, it is 
arguable that the test might be satisfied and yet a court could still find that a defendant 
has not been negligent in the circumstances of the claim.   
Section 10 goes on to provide the following “other principles” in relation to liability for 
breach of duty: 
 
1. The burden of taking precautions to avoid a risk of harm includes the burden of 
taking precautions to avoid similar risks of harm for which the person may be 
responsible; 
 
2. The fact that a risk of harm could have been avoided by doing something in a 
different way does not of itself give rise to liability; 
 
3. The subsequent taking of action that would (had the action been taken earlier) 
have avoided a risk of harm does not of itself give rise to liability. 
 
It is also arguable that these “other principles” also simply clarify, rather than re-state, 
the common law. 
 
Causation (chapter 2, part 1) 
 
Section 11 of the Act contains a statement of general principles concerning the manner 
in which it is to be determined whether a breach of duty has caused particular harm.  For 
there to be a finding that negligence was causative of harm, the following elements must 
be satisfied: 
 
1. The breach of duty must be a necessary condition of the occurrence of the harm 
(in the Act, this is called “factual causation”); 
 
2. It must be appropriate for the scope of the liability of the person in breach to 
extend to the harm so caused (in the Act, this is called “scope of liability”). 
 
If it is relevant to the determination of factual causation to determine what the person 
who has suffered harm would have done if the person in breach of their duty had not 
been in breach, the matter is to be determined subjectively in the light of all relevant 
circumstances.  However, a statement made by the person after suffering the harm 
about what he or she would have done is inadmissible for this purpose (except to the 
extent (if any) that the statement is against the person’s interests). 
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 Assumption of risk (chapter 2, part 1) 
 
Some of the more controversial sections in the Act involve provisions for determining 
liability in cases of obvious and inherent risks.  An obvious risk is defined as a risk which 
would have been obvious to a reasonable person in the position of the person who 
suffered the harm, and include risks that are a matter of common knowledge (Section 
13).  A risk may be classified as obvious even though it has a low probability of occurring 
and even if the risk is not prominent, conspicuous or physically observable. 
Although these provisions appear broad, the Act specifically provides that a risk cannot 
be classified as obvious if it is a risk concerning a thing which has been created because 
of a failure on the part of a person to properly operate, maintain, replace, prepare or care 
for the thing. 
 
Section 14 of the Act is also of great significance in that it reverses the onus of proof in 
claims involving an obvious risk where the defendant has raised the defence of volenti 
non fit injuria (voluntary assumption of risk).  A person will be deemed to be aware of the 
type or kind of an obvious risk, even if the person is not aware of the precise nature, 
extent or manner of occurrence of the risk. 
 
Pursuant to section 15 of the Act, a person does not need to be warned of an obvious 
risk except in the following circumstances: 
1. The person has requested advice or information about the risk; 
2. The defendant is required by a written law to warn the plaintiff of the risk; or 
3. The defendant is a professional, other than a doctor, and the risk is a risk of 
death of or personal injury to the plaintiff from the provision of a professional 
service by the defendant. 
 
Other than in connection with a duty to warn of a risk, a person cannot be liable in 
negligence for an occurrence caused through the materialisation of an inherent risk, 
defined as the risk of something occurring that cannot be avoided by the exercise of 
reasonable care and skill. (Section 16) 
 
Dangerous recreational activities (chapter 2, part 1) 
 
Division 4 of Chapter 2 imports into the Civil Liability Act 2003 a regime for determining 
liability in claims arising from dangerous recreational activities.  Dangerous recreational 
activity is defined as a recreational activity that involves a significant risk of physical 
harm.  A person will not be liable in negligence for harm suffered arising from the 
combination of an obvious risk and a dangerous activity. 
 
The New South Wales equivalent – the Civil Liability (Personal Responsibility) Act 2002 
provides that nothing in the written law of New South Wales renders waiver clauses 
restricting liability void or unenforceable (section 5N).  This provision has not yet taken 
effect and awaits passage through the Commonwealth Parliament of the Trade Practices 
Amendment (Liability for Recreational Service) Bill 2002.  There is no similar recognition 
in the Queensland legislation. 
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 Professional responsibility (chapter 2, part 1) 
 
In relation to doctors, a breach of the duty to warn of a risk will not occur unless the 
doctor fails to provide for the benefit of the patient information about the risk: 
1. That a reasonable person in the patient’s position would, in the circumstances, 
require to enable the person to make a reasonably informed decision about 
whether to undergo the treatment or follow the advice; and 
2. That the doctor knows or ought reasonably to know the patient wants to be given 
before making the decision about whether to undergo the treatment or follow the 
advice. 
 
For the purpose of this section, “patient” includes a person who has the responsibility for 
making a decision for another person under a legal disability. 
 
Section 21 provides that, except in the case of providing advice concerning a warning of 
risk of harm, a professional does not breach a duty of care where their services were 
provided in a manner consistent with a standard widely accepted by their peers, unless 
this body of professional opinion is irrational or contrary to written law. 
 
This section represents a significant departure from the common law duty expected of a 
professional.  Unfortunately, “professional” is simply defined as someone practising a 
profession.  Neither the terms “widely accepted” nor “peer professional opinion” are 
defined in the Act.  However, the Act does state that peer professional opinion does not 
have to be universally accepted to be considered widely accepted.  Further, the fact that 
there are differing peer professional opinions widely accepted in Australia concerning a 
matter does not prevent any one or more (or all) of those opinions being relied on for the 
purposes of determining what is widely accepted by peer professional opinion as 
competent professional practice. 
 
Contributory negligence (chapter 2, part 1) 
 
The principles that are applicable in determining whether a person has been negligent 
also apply in determining whether the person who has suffered harm has been 
contributorily negligent in failing to take precautions against the risk of that harm (Section 
23).  The operation of the common law has been altered in that a court may determine a 
reduction of 100% for contributory negligence if the court thinks it is just and equitable to 
do so (Section 24). 
 
Good Samaritans (chapter 2, part 1) 
 
A Good Samaritan cannot be held liable in respect of any act or omission in an 
emergency when assisting a person who is apparently injured or at risk of being injured.  
The Act does not define “Good Samaritan”, but rather proceeds by reference to a 
“person in distress”, a term which is broadly defined in section 25 to include: 
1. A person who is injured, apparently injured or at risk of injury; and 
2. A person who is suffering, or apparently suffering, from an illness. 
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 Civil liability will not attach to a person rendering first aid or other assistance to a person 
in distress.  For the purposes of the section, the Good Samaritan must be performing 
duties to enhance public safety for a prescribed entity, in the circumstances of an 
emergency and without reckless disregard for the safety of the person in distress. 
 
Proportionate liability (chapter 2, part 2) 
 
Chapter 2 of Part 2 of the Act only applies to claims for damages exceeding $500,000 
and has no application in respect of personal injury actions.  These provisions will 
commence on a date to be proclaimed. 
 
The intention of the Part is to limit the damages payable by any given defendant to an 
amount which represents that proportion of the plaintiff’s damages which are attributable 
to that defendant’s conduct.  The provisions affecting this are as follows: 
1. The liability of a defendant who is a concurrent wrongdoer in relation to a claim is 
limited to an amount reflecting the proportion of the damage claimed, that the 
court considers just having regard to the extent of that defendant’s responsibility 
for the damage (Section 30(1)). 
2. In apportioning responsibility between defendants in proceedings the court is to 
exclude the proportion of the damage to which the plaintiff is contributorily 
negligent and the court may have regard to the comparative responsibility of any 
concurrent wrongdoer who is not a party to the proceedings (section 30(3)). 
3. The provisions apply whether or not all concurrent wrongdoers are party to the 
proceedings (section 30(4)). 
4. A defendant against whom judgment is given as a concurrent wrongdoer cannot 
be required to contribute or indemnify another concurrent wrongdoer in respect of 
the claim (whether in the same or different proceedings). 
5. A plaintiff who has previously recovered judgment against a concurrent 
wrongdoer is not prevented from bringing another action against another 
concurrent wrongdoer.  However, the plaintiff cannot recover total damages 
greater than the actual damage suffered. 
 
Section 31 of the Act maintains the position of joint and several liabilities in the case of 
agency, fraud (including breaches of section 38 of the Fair Trading Act (Qld) and section 
52 of the Trade Practices Act (Cth)) and also with respect to concurrent defendants that 
formed a common intention to commit an intentional tort and actively took part in the 
commission of that tort.  In circumstances where a plaintiff engages a professional to 
advise in relation to prospective loss prevention, both the person whose actions cause 
the loss and the professional can be jointly and severally liable. 
 
Section 33 of the Act provides that these sections will operate subject to the common 
law rules of vicarious responsibility. 
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 Liability of public authorities (chapter 2, part 3) 
 
Part 3 of Chapter 2 concerns the civil liability of public or other authorities, including the 
Crown, government departments, public health organisations and local councils.  The 
Part applies to civil liability including liability where damages are sought in an action for 
breach of contract or any other action. 
 
Section 35 of the Act sets out a number of general principles to be employed in 
determining whether an authority has a duty of care or has breached a duty of care.  The 
provisions largely reflect recent developments in case law involving public authorities.  
Most importantly, when determining whether an authority ought to have exercised a 
function, the courts must take into account the financial and other resources that are 
reasonably available to the authority for the purpose of exercising those functions. 
 
The Act deals specifically with liability claims against road authorities.  A road authority is 
not liable for harm arising from the failure to carry out roadwork, unless at the time of the 
alleged failure the authority had actual knowledge of the particular risk the 
materialisation of which resulted in the harm (Section 37). 
 
Volunteers (chapter 2, part 3) 
 
A volunteer cannot be held liable for an act or omission while doing community work 
organised by a community organisation or as an office-holder of a community 
organisation.  A volunteer is defined as a person who does community work on a 
voluntary basis.  Community work is defined as work that is not for private financial gain 
and that is done for charitable, benevolent, philanthropic, sporting, recreational, political, 
educational or cultural purposes. 
 
The protection contained in section 39 of the Act does not apply in the following 
situations: 
 
1. If the volunteer at the time of the act or omission was engaged in conduct that 
constitutes a criminal offence; 
 
2. If the volunteer was significantly impaired by alcohol or drugs and the volunteer 
failed to exercise reasonable care and skill in doing the work; 
 
3. The volunteer knew or ought to have known that he or she was acting contrary to 
instructions or outside the scope of the activities authorised by the community 
organisation; 
 
4. If the liability of the volunteer is a liability that is required by law to be insured 
against; 
 
5. If the liability would be covered by a motor vehicle third party insurance  policy; 
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 Recovery by criminals (chapter 2, part 4) 
 
Pursuant to the section 45 of the Act, no damages can (generally) be awarded if the 
person whose death, injury or damage, the subject of the proceedings, was engaged in 
conduct that constitutes an indictable offence (whether proven or not) and the conduct 
contributed to the risk of harm.  At the discretion of the court, this absolute defence may 
be lifted although the court must reduce the damages by at least 25% to take into 
account the plaintiff’s criminal conduct. 
 
The Effect of Intoxication (Chapter 2, Part 4) 
 
The provisions of Division 2 of Part 4 introduce significant changes to liability claims 
arising from situations in which claimants are intoxicated.  Intoxication is defined to 
include being under the influence of alcohol or drugs to the extent that a person’s 
capacity to exercise proper skill and care is impaired. 
 
Except for claims arising on licenced premises, a defendant does not owe an intoxicated 
plaintiff a duty of care merely because the plaintiff is intoxicated, nor does the defendant 
owe the plaintiff a higher standard of care than if the plaintiff was sober.  Similarly, a 
court cannot take into account the prospect that a person may be intoxicated when 
considering whether a duty of care arises (Section 46). 
 
A court will presume contributory negligence to the extent of not less than 25% in 
respect of a claim brought by or on behalf of a person who was intoxicated at the time 
the harm occurred.  This presumption may be rebutted by proof of those matters set out 
in section 47(3), including that the intoxication was not self-induced.  A higher level of 
contributory negligence will be assumed in the case of a plaintiff who was driving a 
motor vehicle at the time he or she suffered harm. 
 
If the plaintiff (as passenger) in an action seeking damages for personal injury arising out 
of a motor vehicle accident was at least 16 years old and was, or ought reasonably to 
have been aware that the defendant (driver) was intoxicated, a court will also presume 
contributory negligence of not less than 25%.  Again, this presumption can be rebutted 
(Section 48). 
 
Section 48(5) of the Act removes the defence of volenti non fit injuria (voluntary 
assumption of risk) in respect of these types of claims. 
 
The assessment of damages (chapter 3) 
 
Chapter 3 of the Act is concerned with claims for personal injury damages and mirrors 
similar provisions in the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002, although extends their 
application to other claims, such as those involving motor vehicles.  These provisions 
include (by way of example): 
1. Section 52 of the Act which precludes a court from awarding exemplary, punitive 
or aggravated damages in relation to a claim for personal injury damages, except 
for circumstances involving an intention unlawful act, sexual assault or sexual 
misconduct; 
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 2. Section 54 which provides that damages for loss of earnings are limited to that 
amount which is 3 times the average weekly earnings per week; 
3. All claims for future loss (including damages for the provision of future gratuitous 
services) will be subject to a discount rate of 5%; 
4. A defendant intending to argue that a plaintiff has failed to mitigate his or her 
damages must give the plaintiff a written notice to that effect.  (Section 53) 
 
Interest is no longer available for awards in respect of general damages, defined to 
include pain and suffering, loss of amenities of life, loss of expectation of life or 
disfigurement. 
 
Sections 61 and 62 of the Act prescribe a formula for the quantification of general 
damages.  Provisions contained in the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 relating 
to structured settlements are also expanded. 
 
Apologies (chapter 4) 
 
An “expression of regret” made by or on behalf of a person in connection with any matter 
alleged to have been caused by the person does not constitute an admission of fault or 
liability by the person and is not relevant to the determination of fault or liability in 
connection with the matter.  An expression of regret will be inadmissible in a claim 
arising from the incident which gave rise to the apology. 
 
Other provisions 
 
The Act thereafter amends the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002, including the 
introduction of a two-stage notification procedure that will apply in respect of claims 
involving medical negligence. 
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Introduction 
 
A minor element of the tort law reform sweeping Australia involves the protection of 
volunteers from personal civil liability.  Queensland has enacted the Civil Liability Act 
2003 (Qld) protecting volunteers (including office holders) of community organisations 
from personal civil liability in the course of their duties.1  America pioneered such 
legislation after their ‘civil liability crisis’ in the early 1990s with all states and the federal 
jurisdiction enacting provisions to protect volunteers from personal civil liability.2
 
The Queensland provisions depart from both the American and other Australian 
jurisdiction models3 in a number of areas that are worthy of discussion.  The article first 
places volunteer protection in a policy context of volunteering statements and then 
moves to examine the immediate civil liability issues in Queensland.  A detailed 
examination of the legislation is then undertaken with emphasis on the issues 
community organisations and volunteers face in taking advantage of the provisions. 
 
Volunteer statements 
 
The International Year of the Volunteer in 2001 focused attention on a celebration of the 
thirty two percent of the Australian adult population that contributed 704.1 million hours 
of voluntary work.4  The equivalent wages would be $8.9 billion.5  The Year of the 
Volunteer also generated policy statements about volunteers in various places, from the 
United Nations to the Queensland Government. 
 
A common feature of the volunteering statements is that volunteers should be protected 
from risk.  The United Nations’ recommendations for the support of volunteering suggest 
that governments consider measures to provide "coverage and protection against risks, 
in a way fitting the particular society".6  The International Association for Volunteer Effort 
(IAVE) in its Universal Declaration on Volunteering calls on organisations and 
communities to "provide appropriate protections against risks for volunteers and those 
they serve", and for governments "to remove any legal barriers to participation".7
 
In Australia, the National Agenda on Volunteering:  Beyond the International Year of 
Volunteers states that:  
 
                                                 
1 Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), Part 3, Division 2. 
2 The Volunteer Protection Act 1997 42 USC § 14503 (a) 
3 The Civil Act 2002 (NSW); Wrongs and Other Acts (Public Liability Insurance Reform) Act 2002 
(Vic); The Volunteer Protection Act 2001 (SA); Volunteer (Protection from Liability) Act 2002 
(WA); Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT); Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 
(ACT); Volunteers Protection Act 2003 (Cth).  At the time of writing, Tasmania was proposing to 
introduce a Bill. 
4 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Voluntary Work, (Cat No 4441.0, Canberra 2001), p 3. 
5 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Non-profit Institutions Satellite Account, (Cat No 5256.0, 
Canberra 2002), p 9. 
6 United Nations, Recommendations on ways Governments and the United Nations system could 
support volunteering, (Resolution A/56/L.27, 5 December, 2001), p 5. 
7 International Association for Volunteer Effort, The Universal Declaration on Volunteering, 
(adopted at the 16th World Volunteer Conference, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, January, 2001). 
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 "Many volunteers are exposed to risk, injury, discrimination or prejudice in the 
absence of explicit mention in legislation.  Others carry huge financial 
responsibility or are exposed to legal liability.  It is in the interests of all 
Australians that volunteers are protected under law."8
 
The Volunteering Australia model code of practice for organisations involving volunteer 
staff requires that the organisation will "provide volunteer staff with a healthy and safe 
workplace" and "appropriate and adequate insurance coverage for volunteer staff".9 The 
code of volunteer rights published by the same organisation states that a volunteer has 
the right "to be adequately covered by insurance".10  
 
The Queensland Government’s volunteering policy states that: 
 
"Government and volunteer organisations share an aspiration to ensure that 
volunteers are protected.  This includes facilitating access to affordable and 
suitable insurance cover for volunteer involving organisations, ensuring that 
legislation does not create unnecessary impediments to volunteering, and 
considering legislative protection for volunteers.  The outcome also relates to a 
broader goal of skilling organisations to ensure management of the kinds of risks 
that insurance cover (sic)."11
 
 The initial policy draft suggested a round table on risk management, insurance and 
indemnity issues and alternatives for volunteer insurance including legislative and policy 
approaches.12  The final policy simply states the “government will consider legislative 
mechanisms for ensuring volunteers are able to continue with their volunteering 
activities.”13
 
Such issues in these policy statements were a response to the general unease of 
volunteers about the prospect of civil liability litigation, expressed well before the 
tightening insurance market and the September 11 terrorist event.  Although volunteers 
themselves may be injured in performing their activities, there are few reported cases of 
volunteers being sued for negligent acts or omissions,14 as will be discussed later in the 
article.  This concern expressed by volunteers about their civil liability exposure was the 
driving force behind the South Australian Parliament passing the Volunteer Protection 
Act 2001 (SA).  The South Australian Government identified that a major disincentive to 
volunteering is the prospect of a volunteer incurring serious personal liability for 
damages and legal costs in proceedings for negligence.  It believed that a reasonable 
balance could be maintained between the rights of those injured to receive 
compensation and the need to protect a volunteer from personal liability: 
                                                 
8 Volunteering Australia Inc, A National Agenda on Volunteering: Beyond the International Year of 
Volunteers, (Volunteering Australia, Sydney 2001) p 4. 
9 Volunteering Australia Inc, Model Code of Practice for Organisations involving Volunteer Staff, 
Available <http://www.volunteeringaustralia/code.html>. 
10 Volunteering Australia Inc, Volunteer Rights, Available 
<http://www.volunteeringaustralia/vrights.html> 
11 Queensland Government, Engaging Queensland: The Queensland Government Policy, 
(Brisbane 2001), p 7. 
12 Queensland Government, Engaging Queensland: A Queensland Government Draft Policy and 
Discussion paper on Volunteering, (Brisbane 2001), p 9. 
13 Queensland Government, op cit n 11 at p 7. 
14 Refer text below at notes 33 & 78. 
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"(a) by limiting the personal liability for negligence of a volunteer who works for a 
community organisation and transferring the liability that would apart from this 
Act attach to the volunteer to the community organisation: 
 (b) by limiting the right to bring proceedings against the volunteer personally and 
hence reducing the risk to a volunteer of incurring legal costs as a result of the 
voluntary work."15
 
The South Australian provisions are based on American provisions to protect volunteers 
from personal liability.  In the late 1980s, several US federal politicians began proposing 
ways to remove the personal liability from volunteering.16  In 1990, President George 
H.W.  Bush released a model act and called for its state-by-state adoption.  State 
legislatures began to enact their own volunteer protection statutes and President Clinton 
signed the final version of the federal Volunteer Protection Act into law on June 18, 
1997.  17  The federal Volunteer Protection Act provides immunity for volunteers serving 
nonprofit organisations or governmental entities for harm caused by their acts or 
omissions if: 
 
• the volunteer was acting within the scope of their responsibilities at the time;  
 
• as appropriate or required, the volunteer was licensed, certified, or authorized to 
act; and 
 
• the volunteer was not operating a vehicle, aircraft, or boat for which state law 
required a licence and insurance. 
 
The Act pre-empts state laws to the extent that they are inconsistent with it, but it does 
not pre-empt state laws that provide greater protection from liability for volunteers.   The 
federal legislation specifically does not pre-empt conditions in state laws that: 
 
• make immunity available only to nonprofit organisations that adhere to 
appropriate risk management procedures; 
 
• make nonprofit organisations liable for the acts and omissions of volunteers to 
the same extent that employers are liable for the acts and omissions of  
employees; or 
 
• make immunity available only to nonprofit organisations that provide third parties 
with a financially secure source of recovery, such as liability insurance. 
 
The protections do not apply if: 
 
• the volunteer’s misconduct constitutes a crime of violence, a hate crime, a 
sexual offence, a violation of state or federal civil rights laws; 
 
                                                 
15 Volunteer Protection Act 2001 (SA), Preamble. 
16 For example, Congressman John Porter proposed a volunteer protection Act with the bill 
number 911 to draw attention to the issue. 
17 42 U.S.C.  §§.  14501-14504. 
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 • it was committed under the influence of drugs or alcohol or it constituted an act 
of international terrorism; or 
• the volunteer engages in wilful or criminal misconduct, gross negligence, 
reckless misconduct, or flagrant disregard for the rights and safety of the person 
harmed. 
 
The provision neither provides protection to the nonprofit organisation or governmental 
body that organises the services of a volunteer, nor protects a volunteer from liability to 
the nonprofit organisation. 
 
The American Non-Profit Risk Management Center believes that it was unlikely that 
large numbers of volunteers withdrew because of the fear of liabilities or that potential 
volunteers did not volunteer because of the liability issue.18  It maintains that the 
evidence shows a steadily increasing volunteer rate even during the period before the 
enactment of the provisions.  It does acknowledge that there was considerable 
community concern about the issue of volunteers being caught in litigation.  The 
Center’s research reveals that, three years after the legislation was introduced, the 
number of suits filed against volunteers had not declined.19  It explains this by reference 
to the limited nature of the protection and further that the provisions, “may be helpful to 
plaintiffs seeking damages from volunteers, in that it makes it clear how a suit must be 
styled to require a review of the facts by a judge or jury.”20
 
While reported cases against Australian community organisations (rather than individual 
volunteers) receive general publicity in the popular press, there are few reported cases 
of volunteers being sued for actions arising out of their volunteer activities.  However, as 
illustrated by the results of community consultations at international, national and state 
forums to produce statements for the International Year of the Volunteer, volunteers are 
concerned about their exposure to liability.  It is volunteer officer holders of nonprofit 
organisations that have been involved in some very public reported cases involving 
personal liability.  A successful action against the chair of the Victorian National Safety 
Council for allowing that organisation to trade whilst it was insolvent, resulting in $97 
million in damages, is an exceptional case.21  Volunteer office bearers have been 
subject to increasing legal proceedings for breaches of their duty to prevent insolvent 
trading, unfair dismissal claims by employees and internal disputes in nonprofit 
associations.  However, this was not the immediate trigger for the Queensland volunteer 
protection provisions, which were part of a larger community concern about civil liability. 
 
The immediate Queensland context 
 
A long, soft insurance market cycle ended in early 2001 and all sectors of the economy 
started to experience the effects of a hard market.  Insurance markets run in cycles.  A 
‘soft’ period is a buyer’s market where premiums are low and insurance companies 
actively compete for business.  This is followed by a ‘hard’ period that is a seller’s 
market, where premiums rise without any relation to loss history or profile.  Insurers 
leave parts of the market, or leave the market altogether, through insolvency.  This was 
                                                 
18 Non-Profit Risk Management Center, State Liability Laws for Charitable Organizations and 
Volunteers,  (Washington DC 2001) p 4. 
19 Ibid, p 12  
20 Ibid, p 12. 
21 Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Friedrich & Ors (1991) 9 ACLC 946. 
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 exacerbated in Australia by the collapse of HIH, which had a substantial share of the 
public liability market priced below a sustainable level.  The September 11 attacks also 
impacted on the reinsurance market. 
 
In 2001, a survey undertaken by Commerce Queensland of 1,400 mainly small to 
medium sized businesses revealed that around a quarter had faced premium increases 
of approximately 50% in 2001.22  In September 2001, the State Government requested 
the Queensland Events Corporation to investigate the difficulties being experienced by 
event organisers.23  The survey indicated that 41.6% of respondents had faced 
increases in premiums of more than 50% in the past three years and that 21% would 
have to cancel or scale down their events due to the cost or lack of viability of insurance.  
Sport and recreation organisations experienced rises of between 40-900% and others 
were not able to obtain insurance for some of their ‘high risk’ activities.24
 
A Queensland Council of Social Services Survey of its 800 members, released in July 
2001, reported that approximately 50% of 357 respondents indicated that premiums had 
increased, or would increase.  The average rise was between 30-40%.25  Some 
organisations could not find an insurer; others decided to let policies such as property 
and volunteer protection lapse.  Volunteering Queensland, the peak volunteering body in 
Queensland, also insisted that its members taking its referrals of potential volunteers 
have adequate insurance cover.26
 
By the end of 2001, the State Government was forced into a number of pragmatic 
reactions to the fact that vital community organisations were unable to obtain or afford 
insurance cover.  For example, in December 2001, the State Government pledged to 
underwrite public liability insurance premiums for Parents and Citizens’ Associations, 
which faced premiums as high as $1 million.27  It also provided $80,000 in emergency 
funding to ensure that the Blue Light discos for youth, conducted by the Queensland 
Police Service, were not cancelled by a 700% increase in insurance premiums.28
 
A more measured policy response was the Queensland Government’s appointment of a 
Liability Insurance Taskforce to investigate the impact of public liability insurance 
premiums.  On 3 February 2002, the Federal Government announced a national forum 
of State Ministers to gather data on premium increases and share information, and arrive 
at a range of proposals to be considered by the Council of Australian Governments in 
March 2002.  The Assistant Treasurer, the Hon Helen Coonan, emphasised that the 
public liability insurance issue was one of State rather than Federal responsibility, but 
that the Federal Government was willing to provide a forum to facilitate a coordinated 
approach across jurisdictions. 
 
                                                 
22 Jones, ‘Liability costs to weaken business’, Courier-Mail, 28 January 2002, p 3. 
23 Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, Queensland Events Corporation Event Insurance Review, 
(December 2001), as reported in the Queensland Government, Report Liability Insurance 
Taskforce, (Brisbane, February, 2002) pp 16-17. 
24 Sports Federation of Queensland, 2001 Sports Insurance Survey Summary, 2001. 
25 Queensland Council of Social Services, The Cost of Community Service – Insurance Survey 
2001, (Brisbane July 2001). 
26 ‘Insurance a must: volunteering body’, Southern Star, 23 January 2002, p 12. 
27 Spann, ‘Malled: Insurers shut out shops’, Courier-Mail, 4 January 2002, p 1.   
28 Morley, ‘Bulk-buy insurance to save charities’, Sunday Mail, 17 February 2002, p 5. 
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 The Queensland State Government Taskforce proposed a number of options to assist 
community organisations to obtain appropriate insurance cover and to reduce the cost of 
cover to these groups.29  It also considered legal reforms for capping personal liability, 
but volunteer protection was not specifically dealt with in the report. 
 
The State and Federal National Forum’s Review of the Law of Negligence (Ipp Report) 
devoted a chapter to nonprofit organisations30 and another section to the issue of 
volunteer liability.  The Report recommended that such nonprofit organisations should 
not have their liability limited for negligently caused personal injury or death.31  The 
reason given for this position was: 
 
“that it would not, on balance, be in the public interest to provide the NPO sector 
as such with general limitations of, or a general exemption from, liability for 
negligently-caused personal injury and death.”32
 
 The review noted that nonprofit organisations provide a diverse range of services to the 
public with significant risks to the public of suffering and personal injury, often to the 
underprivileged and vulnerable members of society.  The risks were no different from 
those facing for-profit organisations, and nonprofits should face incentives to take care in 
their operations and be responsible to those suffering injury because of their fault. 
 
In respect of volunteer protection, the Ipp Report stated that: 
 
“The Panel is not aware of any significant volume of negligence claims against 
volunteers in relation to voluntary work, or that people are being discouraged 
from doing voluntary work by the fear of incurring negligence liability.”33
 
The Ipp Report examined the South Australian Volunteers Protection Act 2001 (SA) and 
the imposition of liability on the community organisation for the acts and omissions of the 
volunteer.  It decided not to make a recommendation that this should be followed, as it 
would adversely “affect the interests of not-for-profit community organisations.”34 It 
characterises the South Australian provision as an exception to the basic rule that 
vicarious liability attaches to the relationship of employer and employee.  Later in this 
article it will be argued that the current state of the law is not so clear as stated by the 
Review and community organisations may face the prospect of being vicariously liable.35
 
The Ipp Report also recommended that there be no change to the case in which a Good 
Samaritan gives assistance in an emergency.  It was unable to find cases, claims or 
insurance-related difficulties arising out of such situations.36
 
                                                 
29 Queensland Government, Report Liability Insurance Taskforce, (Brisbane, February, 2002) 
30 Ipp, Crane & Sheldon, Review of the Law of Negligence Report, (Ipp Report, Canberra, 2 
October 2002). 
31 Ibid, Recommendation 10, p 61. 
32 Ibid, p 60. 
33 Ibid, p 170. 
34 Ibid, p 170. 
35 See text accompanying note 78 below. 
36 Op cit n 30, Recommendation 16 at p 70. 
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 However, at the second Ministerial Meeting on Public Liability Insurance on 30 May 
2002, there was agreement for the protection of volunteers and nonprofit organisations 
despite the Ipp Report’s recommendations.37  The New South Wales Government acted 
promptly with the Civil Liability Amendment Act 2002, assented to on 18 June 2002, 
which the Joint Communique of the Ministerial Meeting of 15 November regarded as a 
model for other jurisdictions.38  Part Nine of the New South Wales Act deals with 
protection of volunteers from civil liability, and the Queensland provisions in respect of 
volunteers follow the general pattern of these provisions.  There are, however, some 
differences, which will be noted below. 
 
Queensland Civil Liability Act 2003 
 
Part 3 Division 2 of the Civil Liability Act 2003 deals with the protection of volunteers 
from civil liability while doing community work.  It differs from provisions in other States, 
but shares a number of concepts with the New South Wales provisions. 
Section 39 of the Act states: 
 
“A volunteer does not incur any personal civil liability in relation to any 
act or omission done or made by the volunteer in good faith when doing 
community work— 
(a) organised by a community organisation; or 
(b) as an office holder of a community organisation.” 
 
The words ‘volunteer’, ‘community work’ and ‘community organisation’ are all further 
defined in section 38.  These definitions confine the protection of the volunteer by an 
activity test and an organisational test. 
 
The definition of a volunteer is quite traditional and section 38 defines ‘volunteer’ to 
mean a person who does community work on a voluntary basis.  A volunteer can be 
reimbursed their reasonable expenses in doing their work without affecting their 
volunteer status.  The reimbursement of reasonable travel or meal costs, for example, 
will not affect their status as a volunteer.   
 
Community work 
 
The activity test is found in the definition of ‘community work’.  Community work means 
work that is not for private financial gain and is done for a charitable, benevolent, 
philanthropic, sporting, recreational, political, educational or cultural purpose.  The word 
‘work’ in this context is widely defined to include any activity. 
 
The widely drafted list of activities is not confined to charitable activities that must be for 
certain purposes and for the public benefit.  The expression of activities is more concise 
than similar provisions in other jurisdictions.  The Western Australian provisions 
specifically include conservation, environment and even more broadly “for any other 
purpose approved under section 4(1)(f) of the Associations Incorporation Act 1987”.39  It 
                                                 
37 Press Release 15 Nov 2002  
38 Joint Communique, Ministerial Meeting on Public Liability Insurance, 15 November, 2002, 
Brisbane, Available <http:// assistant 
treasurer.gov.au/atr/content/publications/2oo2/2002115_2.asp>. 
39 Volunteers (Protection from Liability) Act 2002 (WA), s 4(1). 
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 is likely that the definition of charity in Queensland would include a significant proportion 
of conservation and environmental activities.40  The Victorian provisions include ‘tourism’ 
in that jurisdiction’s list of activities.41  
 
Western Australia, New South Wales, South Australia, Northern Territory, Australian 
Capital Territory and Victoria all have provision to deal further with such activity 
classification by regulation.42  Queensland has not made provision for regulations and it 
is unlikely that section 74, which contains general regulation power, could be of any 
assistance to making regulations in this instance.43
 
Before examining the types of organisations, it is worth noting that section 38 requires 
that the type of work must be ‘organised’ by the community organisation.  The meaning 
of organised includes ‘directed or supervised’ by the community organisation.  This 
would appear to exclude volunteers that act unilaterally to assist a community 
organisation without any prior recognition by the organisation.  A volunteer who assists 
without the knowledge of the organisation may have difficulty in seeking protection from 
liability (unless the Good Samaritan provisions apply).  For example, neither 
 
• a person who starts collecting funds for an organisation without any prior notice 
to the organisation,  
nor 
• a stranger who independently appears at a fire and works alongside volunteer 
rural fire brigade workers, 
 
would come within the ordinary meaning of ‘organised’.44  It is already a widespread 
practice to require volunteers to be formally identified before they begin an activity for a 
community organisation. 
 
The organisational test contained in section 38 defines ‘community organisation’ to 
mean: 
 
• a corporation; 
• a trustee acting in the capacity of a trustee; 
• a church or other religious group; 
• a registered political party; or 
• a government agency, local authority or public authority. 
 
The definition of a corporation would include an Incorporated Association and a 
company limited by guarantee; the two most common legal forms for Queensland 
nonprofit organisations.  Section 36 of The Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) defines 
                                                 
40 Picarda, The Law and Practice Relating to Charities, (3rd ed, Butterworths, London, 1999) p 
164. 
41 Wrongs and Other Acts (Public Liability Insurance Reform) Act 2002 (Vic), s 36. 
42 The Civil Act 2002 (NSW) s 60(2); Wrongs and Other Acts (Public Liability Insurance Reform) 
Act 2002 (Vic) s 36; The Volunteer Protection Act 2001 (SA); Volunteer (Protection from Liability) 
Act 2002 (WA) s 3; Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT) s 7 (7); Civil Law 
(Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 7. 
43 It is doubtful that the power to make a statutory instrument for the section would be within 
section 22 of the Statutory Instruments Act 1922 (Qld). 
44 Other Good Samaritan provisions may apply. 
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 ‘corporation’ as including a body politic or corporate.  A ‘body politic’ in modern legal 
usage refers to a political unit such as the Crown in right of the Commonwealth or a 
State or Territory.  Government departments are not bodies politic in their own right, but 
part of the Commonwealth, State or Territory.  It can also mean a foreign nation and its 
government.  The term ‘body politic’ has, in the past, been applied to ‘other organized 
groups with a government’,45 however, it appears to have fallen into disuse. 
 
‘Body corporate’ is not further defined in the Acts Interpretation Act 1954(Qld), but it 
does have a common law meaning.  In common law, ‘body corporate’ and ‘corporation’ 
have the same meaning.  A body corporate is an organisation or office that has been 
incorporated, for example by Royal Charter, letters of patent, or statute.  Nearly six 
hundred Queensland nonprofit organisations have letters of patent under The Religious 
Educational and Charitable Institutions Act 1861 (Qld) and a number are established by 
Royal Charter. 
 
The Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), which facilitates the registration of companies limited 
by guarantee, is only one of many statutes that establish corporations.  Examples of 
body corporates created by other authorities are: 
 
• Incorporated Associations; 
 
• Co operatives; 
 
• Bodies created under the Roman Catholic (Incorporation of Church Entities) Act 
1994 (Qld); and 
 
• Organisations under the Industrial Relations Act 1999 (Qld). 
 
Examples of body corporates created by their own special Act are: 
 
• Uniting Church in Australia Act 1977 (Qld); 
 
• The Brisbane City Council under (City of Brisbane Act 1924(Qld)); and 
 
• Corporations Sole (eg.The Minister of Education pursuant to the Education 
(General Provisions) Act 1989 (Qld) which acts for Parents and Citizens’ 
Associations in State schools). 
 
Trustees acting in their capacity of a trustee will also be a type of community 
organisation for the purposes of the provisions.  Some organisations, often known as 
foundations, are charitable trusts.  An example is the Queensland Community 
Foundation whose trustee is The Public Trustee in Queensland. 
 
The definition of community organisations also includes ‘a church or other religious 
group’.  In this context, a church would refer not to a building, but a “quasi-corporate 
institution which carries on the religious work of the denomination whose name it 
bears”.46  In many instances, the larger denominations have legal structures where the 
                                                 
45 Ford, Austin & Ramsay, Ford’s Principles of Corporations, (10th ed Butterworths, Melbourne, 
2001) para 2.050 
46 MacLaughlin v Campbell [1906] 1 Ir R 877, per FitzGibbon LJ.   
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 members of the church have a consensual compact based on a set of beliefs, which is, 
at best, an unincorporated association.47  Other legal vehicles hold the property of the 
church on behalf of the members.  McPherson J in Bailey v The Uniting Church in 
Australia 1984 1 Qd R.  42 at 46-47 wrote of the Letters of Patent of the Presbyterian 
Church of Queensland that it is: 
 
“quite clear that what is incorporated are simply the holders for the time being of 
...the association to which they belong, and not the members of the association 
as such.”48
 
A registered political party as defined under the Electoral Act 1992 (Qld) or the 
Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Clth) will also be a type of community organisation. 
 
The last type of organisation is a public or other authority that is defined in section 34 as: 
 
“(a) the Crown (within the meaning of the Crown Proceedings Act 1980 (Qld)); or 
(b) a local government; or 
(c) any public authority constituted under an Act.” 
 
It is not commonly recognized that governments do engage significant numbers of 
volunteers.  Conroy recently surveyed Queensland Government departments to find that 
four of the larger departments had over 90,000 volunteers.49
 
Volunteer office holders  
 
Queensland and New South Wales are the only jurisdictions where ‘an office holder of a 
community organisation’ is specifically mentioned in the volunteer protection provisions.  
This would include management committee members in an Incorporated Association 
and directors of a company limited by guarantee.  In a Letters of Patent body, the 
corporators (usually by reference to a office such as Chair, Master of the College or 
Archbishop) mentioned in the letters patent would fall within the definition, and might 
extend to other offices not on the face of the Letters patent themselves, but included in 
the constitution of the organisation. 
 
In most United States jurisdictions, the provisions also apply to office holders, although it 
is expressly stated that the organisation can still sue the office holder in spite of the 
legislative protection.50  Office holders may do injury to the organisation, particularly in 
respect of their duties owed primarily to the organisation.  It is by no means clear 
whether, under the right circumstances, a nonprofit organisation might be prevented 
from suing its office holder for a breach of their duties to the organisation.  It would be 
unusual public policy for such an action to be prevented. 
 
                                                 
47 Scandrett v Dowling (1992) 27 NSWLR 483; McPherson, “The Church as Consensual 
Compact, Trust and Corporation” (2000) ALJ 159. 
48 Bailey v The Uniting Church in Australia 1984 1 Qd R.  42 at pp  46-47 
49 Conroy, Preliminary Research Findings: Volunteers in Queensland State Government, (Centre 
of Philanthropy and Nonprofit Studies Working Paper No 5, Brisbane 2002), p 5. 
50 The US Federal Act protects volunteers from suit, but retains the ability for the organisation to 
sue the volunteer, The Volunteer Protection Act 1997 42 USC § 14503(a) Section 4 (b&c).  The 
definition of volunteer includes ”director, officer, trustee or direct service volunteer” S 6 (B). 
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 Commencement of Volunteer Protection 
 
The provisions take effect on 9 April 2003, the day the Act was given assent.  The 
provisions would apply to volunteer activities after the 9 April 2003.  Some other parts of 
the Act are retrospective in operation and some commence on a date fixed by 
proclamation.  Although the courts will presume that mere procedural matters are 
retrospective, this is not the case in this instance because it deals with the rights of a 
party to seek redress for injury.51  It is clear that these provisions are not retrospective 
and so volunteers who have attracted civil liability claims before 9 April 2003 will still 
have to deal with such claims. 
 
Matters outside the Civil Liability Act 
 
Some matters are expressly excluded from the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) and thus a 
volunteer will not be protected from any personal civil liability arising from such matters.  
Section 9 excludes any civil claim for damages for an injury: 
 
• resulting from the breach of duty owed to the claimant, or including an injury as 
defined under the Workcover Queensland Act 1996; 
 
• that is a dust-related condition; or 
 
• resulting from smoking or other use of tobacco products or exposure to tobacco 
smoke. 
 
The Workcover Queensland Act 1996 (Qld) ought not as a matter of public policy be 
overridden by the provisions of the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld).  The Workcover 
Queensland Act 1996 (Qld) also contains provisions dealing with a number of volunteer 
situations, such as counter disaster volunteers, rural fire brigade members and persons 
in voluntary or honorary positions with religious, charitable, benevolent or nonprofit 
organisations.52  The provisions are expressed so that Workcover Queensland may 
insure such persons, but they fall outside the range of persons that employers are 
required by law to insure with Workcover Queensland, and thus the Civil Liability Act 
2003 (Qld). 
 
A complex situation could arise where, as part of a worker’s employment, the employer 
directed their employees to ‘volunteer’ for a community organisation.  ‘Business – 
community partnership’ in 2000-01 involved some $182 million of such assistance from 
businesses to community organisations.53 Is the person a ‘volunteer’ or a ‘worker’?  If 
the person is being directed by his or her employer as part of their duties to ‘volunteer’ 
for a community organisation, then it is likely that: 
 
• the person will fall under the provisions in the Workcover Queensland Act 1996 
(Qld); and 
                                                 
51 Maxwell v Murphy (1957) 96 CLR 261 and Azzopardi v South Johnstone Co-operative Sugar 
Milling Assoc Ltd [1953] St Qld 120. 
52 Workcover Queensland Act 1996 (Qld) Division 3, Subdivision 1. 
53 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Generosity of Australian Business, (Cat no 8157.0, Canberra 
2002) p 3.  Such arrangements normally involve the voluntary transfer of money, goods or 
services in exchange for strategic business benefits. 
Centre of Philanthropy and Nonprofit Studies 23 Working Paper No. CPNS18 
 • be outside the definition of volunteer in the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), as 
section 38(2) which defines a volunteer as not receiving any remuneration. 
 
It is a matter worth considering in the provisions of business community partnerships, 
which are becoming more common.54
 
Acting outside the scope of activities or contrary to instructions 
 
Section 42 withdraws the protection of volunteers from personal liability if they knew or 
ought reasonably to have known that they were acting: 
 
• outside the scope of activities authorised by the community organization; or 
• contrary to instructions given by the community organisation. 
 
As many organisations are formalising their volunteer processes with role descriptions, 
induction training, formal supervision review meetings and other policy documents, these 
written documents may well serve to provide evidence to the court about whether the 
provision applies in a particular situation. 
 
Liability not excluded for criminal acts 
 
A volunteer will be unable to claim the protection of the Act if, at the time of the act or 
omission giving rise to the liability, they were engaged in conduct that constitutes an 
offence.  An offence refers to a criminal offence that is defined in The Criminal Code as 
“an act or omission which renders the person doing the act or making the omission liable 
to punishment.”55  The term includes all types of illegal acts and omissions punishable 
under the criminal law of Queensland and this includes not only those offences in the 
Code, but also in other statutes.56 It will not include an offence against the law of the 
Commonwealth.57  The standard proof required is the civil standard, being on the 
balance of probabilities, rather than the more onerous ‘beyond reasonable doubt’. 
 
Liability not excluded if insurance required 
 
Section 43 denies a volunteer the protection of the provisions if a written Queensland 
law requires the liability to be insured against.  The most common liability that is required 
by statute to be insured against by nonprofit organisations is ‘damage to property, death 
or bodily injury occurring upon the property of the incorporated association’.58  However, 
it appears that this may not be an instance covered by the section as it refers to the 
liability of the association, not that of the Incorporated Association’s volunteers. 
 
A more relevant example is s 36 of the State Counter-Disaster Organisation Act 1975 
(Qld) where insurance is required to cover members of the State Emergency Service 
(SES) or local emergency service.  A majority of serious accidents involving personal 
                                                 
54 See further on this issue, McGregor-Lowndes & Scaife, “Business Community Partnerships: 
getting it right” (2003) 55 Keeping Good Companies – Journal of Chartered Secretaries Australia 
Ltd 214; McDonald v Commonwealth (1946) 46 SRCNSW 129.   
55 The Criminal Code (Qld) s 2. 
56 Hunt v Maloney 1959 Qd.  R.  164 at 169. 
57 Kiely v R [1974] WAR 180. 
58 Incorporated Associations Act 1981 (Qld) s 70. 
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 civil liability occur in respect of motor vehicles.  Section 44 of the Civil Liability Act 
provides that the provisions of volunteer protection do not apply where a CTP insurance 
policy under the Motor Accidents Insurance Act 1994 (Qld) applies. 
 
Intoxicated volunteers 
 
Section 41 provides that any claim where the volunteer was intoxicated when doing the 
work and failed to exercise due care and skill when doing the work will be excluded from 
protection.  The meaning of ‘intoxicated’ includes a person under the influence of alcohol 
or a drug to the extent that a person’s capacity to exercise proper care and skill is 
impaired.  This will include not only alcohol, but also medication, which may 
inadvertently affect the ability of a volunteer. 
 
Position of the community organisation 
 
The impact of the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) on community organisations that engage 
volunteers is also worthy of examination.  Some jurisdictions provide a specific provision 
that renders the community organisation vicariously liable for a volunteer’s acts and 
omissions, even though the volunteer is immune from legal action.59  In Queensland the 
provisions are silent on this aspect. 
  
Although there are few reported cases about the duty of care of a community 
organisation to its volunteers, it appears that they owe them similar duties to those of 
their paid employees.  In Di Bella v La Boite Theatre Inc and Cairns City Council, White 
J noted that a volunteer performer in the context of providing a safe workplace “was in 
the same position as an employee” to a community organisation.60  Workplace Health 
and Safety provisions in all jurisdictions make little distinction between employees, 
independent contractors, visitors and volunteers.61  The Federal Ipp Report, in response 
to the term of reference about exempting or limiting the liability of nonprofit 
organisations, made a strong recommendation that they not be exempted or given any 
concessions in respect of liabilities.62
 
It is evident that community organisations are beginning to manage their responsibilities 
to volunteers with the same seriousness as required for employees.  Volunteering 
Australia Inc, the peak body of volunteering organisations, has devised national 
standards for the human resource management of volunteers.63  These take in policies 
for recruiting volunteers including: pre-engagement reference checks; screening and 
interview; job descriptions to induction processes; ongoing training and development; 
grievance procedures; work appraisals; discipline and feedback; recognition; and even 
termination and exit interviews.  It may appear that one difference from employee 
policies is that there would be no policies about remuneration of volunteers.  Although 
                                                 
59 Wrongs and Other Acts (Public Liability Insurance Reform) Act 2002 (Vic) s 37(2); The 
Volunteer Protection Act 2001 (SA) s 5; Volunteer (Protection from Liability) Act 2002 (WA) s 7; 
Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT) s 7(3); Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 
(ACT) s 9. 
60 No.  113 of 1999 District Court of Queensland, (15 February 2001) at p 6. 
61  For example,  Workplace Health and Safety Act 1995 (Qld) s 10 
62 Ipp op cit n 30, at pp 59-65. 
63 Volunteering Australia, National Standards for involving volunteers in not for Profit 
Organisations,  (2nd ed, Volunteering Australia Inc, Melbourne 2001). 
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 this is correct, there are policies on reimbursing volunteer expenses such as travel, 
meals and other personal expenditure and significant policies on recognising the efforts 
of volunteers and their service delivery performance.  If community organisations are 
treating their volunteers on the same basis as employees, except that they are rewarded 
in different ways, will this influence the courts to extend the vicarious liability of 
community organisations for their employees to also include their volunteers? 
 
Employers are vicariously liable for the torts of their employees.64  The vicarious liability 
arises because of the special relationship between the defendant and the wrongdoer 
and may not involve any element of fault on the part of the employer.  Clearly volunteers 
are not employees, because there is no contract of employment and there is no 
consideration or payment for services.  However, as indicated above, all the other 
incidents of employment are now being found in the relationship between a community 
organisation and a volunteer.  Will the category of special relationships that constitute 
vicarious liability be widened to include the volunteer relationship? 
 
The courts have recognized that the driving basis of vicarious liability is one of public 
policy, rather than common law principles.65  The policy justifications are numerous 
ranging from Bacon’s indulgence thesis and Pollock’s analogy, to other areas of strict 
liability, to economic theories of loss distribution.66  The Chief Justice of the Australian 
High Court in a consideration of three cases involving vicarious liability stated: 
 
“The absence of a satisfactory and comprehensive jurisprudential basis for the 
imposition of liability on a person for the harmful acts or omissions of others – 
vicarious liability, as it is called – is a matter which has provoked much comment.  
It may be that the lack of a satisfactory jurisprudential bias is referable, at least in 
significant part, to the fact that certain cases have been decided by reference to 
policy considerations without real acknowledgement of that fact.”67
 
An examination of whether the court could justify adding the volunteer relationship to 
other special relationships involving various liabilities is beyond the scope of this article, 
but there are some signs of judicial movement in that direction. 
 
There are a number of authorities that consider the issue of whether volunteers are 
employees for the purposes of vicarious liability.  Atiyah,68 in his early text on vicarious 
liability, notes that scoutmasters are not servants of the Boy Scouts Association.  Nor is 
this the case for a member of a Salvation Army band.69  Trindade and Cane give an 
example of social service authorities and foster parents.70
 
The Laws of Australia commentary on vicarious liability for criminal matters states that: 
                                                 
64 Trindade and Cane, The Law of Torts in Australia, (3rd  ed, Oxford University Press, Melbourne 
1999) p 717. 
65 Queensland Law Reform Commission, Vicarious Liability, Report No 56, Brisbane, December 
2001, p  9. 
66 Atiyah, Vicarious Liability in the Law of Torts, (Butterworths, London, 1967). 
67 State of NSW v Lepore, Samin v State of Queensland; Rich v State of Queensland [2003] HCA 
4 at para 106 
68 Atiyah, op cit n 66 at pp 15 - 28. 
69 Murphy v Zoological Society (1962) Times, November 14th; London General Omnibus Co.  v 
Booth (1983) 63 LJQB 244. 
70 Trindade & Cane, op cit n 64 at p 734. 
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“It is unclear whether the vicarious responsibility extends to the conduct of a 
person who is not employed as an agent or employee but who performs a similar 
task as a friend, relative or volunteer”.71
 
The doctrine of common employment also has what Atiyah describes as “one odd corner 
of the law” applicable to volunteers.72  In common employment, employers were 
protected from actions by their employees seeking to make the employer liable for the 
acts of fellow servants.  This is now abolished by statute.  There is a series of cases 
where a person renders voluntary assistance to an employee and in the course of doing 
so is injured.  Volunteers could not invoke a relationship of vicarious liability with the 
employer as it would put them in a better position than the employee.73  Munkman in his 
text The Employer’s Duty at Common Law states that, after the abolition of this defence, 
the relationship of master and servant could be established where a volunteer was 
unpaid and the employer would be vicariously liable.74  He boldly states that: 
 
“In principle, the relationship of master and servant is also created, and all of the 
usual consequences follow, where a plaintiff has volunteered to do work without 
pay under the orders of another person”.75
 
He draws upon volunteer rescuer cases to support this statement.76
 
In Seely v Gray,77 White J noted Munkman’s thesis about volunteers, but failed to 
consider it fully.  In that case, a work experience student was injured leading a bull.  He 
claimed that he was working in a voluntary capacity.  The facts showed that the plaintiff, 
through persistent disobedience of instructions, was not under the control of the 
defendant and was neither an employee, nor volunteer.   
 
More recently, Higgins J positively stated by way of obiter dicta that “Vicarious liability 
does not attach only to the actions of paid employees and agents.  It also applies to 
volunteers.”78  In that case, a gym teacher used students as volunteers to assist in 
preventing injury to other students attempting handstand exercises.  The school 
authority, through the teacher, instructed and supervised the volunteers and a vicarious 
relationship resulted between the wrongdoer and the school authority.  Authority for the 
proposition was based on the case of Pratt v Patrick [1924] 1 KB 488 where the owner of 
a car was held vicariously liable for the negligence of a volunteer driver of the car in 
which he was a passenger.  Eburn, who has written extensively in the area of legal 
liability of emergency service volunteers, states: 
 
                                                 
71 The Laws of Australia, The Law Book Company, Criminal Law Principles, Vol.  9, para 158 
1999 The Law Book Co Ltd, citing Abercromby v Morris (1932) 48 TLR 635 and Carter v Burdoe 
(1928) 45 WN (NSW) 17 
72 Atiyah, op cit n 66 at p 419.   
73 Degg v Midland Rly Co (1857) 1 H & N 733. 
74 Munkman, Employer’s Liability at Common Law (10th ed,  Butterworths, London 1985) pp 88-89 
& pp 631-633 
75 Ibid, p 630. 
76 For example, Chadwick v British Transport Commission [1967] 2 All ER 945. 
77 (1987) 48 SASR 130 at p 146. 
78 Duncan by her next friend v Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Archdiocese of 
Canberra and Goulburn [1998] SCACT 109 (14 October 1998) at para 42. 
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 “Although volunteers are not employees, the principle is the same, they are 
acting for the benefit of their organisation and it would be unreasonable for them 
to pay, or the person harmed by their conduct to look to them to pay, so the 
organisation will be liable.”79
 
The Ipp Report discussed the issue of whether community organisations should be 
vicariously liable for the torts of their volunteers as proposed by the Volunteers 
Protection Act 2001 (SA).  The report noted that volunteers were not employees 
because there was no contract of service, not independent contractors as there was no 
contract for services and that they typically were not agents.80  It was decided to make 
no recommendation on the matter because to recommend vicarious liability would 
conflict with the objectives of their terms of reference to limit liability in negligence rather 
than expand it.  This would specifically affect the interests of community organisations.81
 
Despite the Ipp report, the provisions in Western Australia, South Australia, Victoria, 
Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory make the community organisation 
that is supervising the volunteer vicariously liable for the actions of the volunteer.82  This 
is omitted in New South Wales and Queensland and there is no indication about whether 
a community organisation is or is not vicariously liable for the tort of a volunteer. 
 
If a community organisation is at common law vicariously liable not only for the torts of 
its employees, but also its volunteers, then can it be liable for the torts of a volunteer 
who is protected from suit by a volunteer protection provision?  Does the immunity of a 
volunteer from civil suit also extinguish the various liability of the community 
organisation?  Atiyah states that: 
 
“as soon as the tort was committed a cause of action against both the master 
and servant vested in the plaintiff, and although the latter was destroyed, nothing 
has happened to take away the former”.83
 
He bases this proposition on two authorities that concern mere procedural bars.  One, 
that a felon cannot be sued in tort unless first prosecuted84 and the other where a 
servant obtains a certificate of discharge for the assault that also occasioned the tort.85  
The cases of Broom v Morgan [1953] 1 QB 597 and Waugh v Waugh (1950) 50 SR 
(NSW) 210 were about the personal immunity of husband and wife from suit under the 
old common law.  Although the plaintiff could not sue their spouse, could the spouse’s 
employer be sued vicariously?  The English Court of Appeal in Broom v Morgan found 
that the situation was properly characterised as “immunity from suit and not an immunity 
                                                 
79 Eburn, “Emergency Service Volunteers and Legal Liability: Who pays when things go wrong?” 
(5 August, 2001) Workshop at the ‘Celebrating Volunteers: The Heart Beat of the Nation’ 
conference, Adelaide at p 9. 
80 Ipp, op cit n 30,  p 170. 
81 Ibid, pp 170-171. 
82 Wrongs and Other Acts (Public Liability Insurance Reform) Act 2002 (Vic) s 37(2); The 
Volunteer Protection Act 2001 (SA) s 5; Volunteer (Protection from Liability) Act 2002 (WA) s 7; 
Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT) s 7(3); Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 
(ACT) s 9. 
83 Aityah,op cit n 66 p 8 
84 Osborn v Gillett (1873) L.R.  8 Exch.  88. 
85 Dyer v Munday [1875] 1 QB 742. 
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 from duty or liability”.86  The employer was vicariously liable, not withstanding that the 
wife was unable to sue the husband.  A similar view was taken in Waugh v Waugh by 
the New South Wales Court of Appeal. 
 
It may well be that New South Wales and Queensland community organisations face 
vicarious liability for the torts of their volunteers, but the situation is unclear.  This 
uncertainty is unfortunate as it creates a sense of apprehension among those who are 
charged with administering community organisations: in the main, volunteers, even if the 
volunteers might seek a personal indemnity under the Act. 
 
The final issue that many community organisations may consider is the ability of such 
organisations to have an indemnity, agreement or understanding with volunteers 
whereby they would indemnify the organisation for any liability due to vicarious liability.  
The volunteer protection provisions in Victoria, Northern Territory and Western Australia 
make such indemnities of no effect.87  The Queensland provisions in section 7(3) 
positively state that it “does not prevent the parties to a contract from making express 
provisions for their rights, obligations and liabilities” to any matter to which the provisions 
apply.  It appears that an appropriately worded agreement with indemnities between a 
volunteer and their community organisation may be permitted under the Queensland 
provisions. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The volunteer protection provisions, although minor in the scheme of current civil liability 
reform, will have an impact on the way in which community services are delivered.  
Volunteers should not be too complacent that they are simply protected for any 
volunteering activity that they perform, but look to the extensive restriction placed on 
such immunity from suit.  Now that tort compensation in respect of the wrong doing of a 
volunteer is removed, the policy issue of financial support for those who suffer personal 
injury is yet to be resolved.  In some jurisdictions it has been resolved by placing the 
burden on the community organisation.  This may be a defective remedy for those 
reluctant to sue uninsured and asset poor nonprofit organisations.  In Queensland, one 
view of the law is that it will be up to the injured party to make their own arrangements.  
This may also not be a socially desirable outcome given that volunteers often deal with 
the underprivileged and vulnerable members of society who are in the worst position to 
make such arrangements. 
 
In those jurisdictions where the community organisation is liable for the torts of their 
volunteers, it can be expected that they will take far more care to appropriately manage 
the risks that this poses for the organisation.  Ironically, many community organisations 
in New South Wales and Queensland will choose to act as if they were vicariously liable 
for the torts of their volunteers because the law is unsettled on this issue. 
                                                 
86 Broom v Morgan [1953] 1 All ER 849 at  p 855. 
87 Wrongs and Other Acts (Public Liability Insurance Reform) Act 2002 (Vic) s 40; Volunteer 
(Protection from Liability) Act 2002 (WA) s 8; Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 
2003 (NT) s 7(5). 
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 CIVIL LIABILITY ACT 2003 
 
 
Act No. 16 of 2003 
Extract of Legislation 
 
The complete text of the Act can be obtained from the Queensland Government Web 
site http://www.legislation.qld.gov.au.  (Look under Bills tab and then Bills introduced in 
2003.) 
 
Division 2—Volunteers 
 
38 Interpretation 
 
(1) In this division— 
 
“community organisation” means any of the following that organises the 
doing of community work by volunteers— 
 
(a) a corporation; 
(b) a trustee acting in the capacity of trustee; 
(c) a church or other religious group; 
(d) a registered political party as defined under the Electoral Act 1992 or the 
Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cwlth); 
(e) a public or other authority as defined under section 34. 
 
“community work” means work that is not for private financial gain and 
that is done for a charitable, benevolent, philanthropic, sporting, 
recreational, political, educational or cultural purpose. 
 
“organised” includes directed or supervised. 
 
“volunteer” means a person who does community work on a voluntary 
basis. 
 
“work” includes any activity. 
 
(2) For the purposes of this division— 
 
(a) community work done by a person under an order of a court is not to be 
regarded as work done on a voluntary basis; and 
 
(b) community work for which a person receives remuneration by way of 
reimbursement of the person’s reasonable expenses in doing the work is to be 
regarded as work done on a voluntary basis. 
 
39 Protection of volunteers 
 
A volunteer does not incur any personal civil liability in relation to any 
act or omission done or made by the volunteer in good faith when doing 
community work— 
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(a) organised by a community organisation; or 
(b) as an office holder of a community organisation. 
 
40 Liability not excluded for criminal acts 
 
This division does not confer protection from personal liability on a volunteer in relation 
to an act or omission of the volunteer if it is established (on the balance of probabilities) 
that at the time of the act or omission the volunteer was engaged in conduct that 
constitutes an offence. 
 
41 Liability of intoxicated volunteer not excluded 
 
The protection from personal liability conferred on a volunteer by this division in 
connection with any community work does not apply if the volunteer— 
 
(a) was intoxicated when doing the work; and 
(b) failed to exercise due care and skill when doing the work. 
 
42 Liability of volunteer not excluded if acting outside scope of activities or 
contrary to instructions 
 
This division does not confer protection on a volunteer from personal liability in relation 
to an act or omission of a volunteer if the volunteer knew or ought reasonably to have 
known that he or she was acting— 
 
(a) outside the scope of the activities authorised by the community organisation 
concerned; or 
 
(b) contrary to instructions given by the community organisation. 
 
43 Liability not excluded if insurance required 
 
This division does not confer protection from personal liability on a volunteer if the 
liability is a liability that is required under a written law of the State to be insured against. 
 
44 Liability not excluded for motor accidents 
 
The protection from personal liability conferred on a volunteer by this division does not 
apply if the liability would, apart from this division, be covered by a CTP insurance policy 
under the Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994, or be recoverable from the Nominal 
Defendant under that Act. 
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